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Staggered Price Setting




he nominal interest rate cannot be less than zero: no one would choose
to hold assets bearing a guaranteed negative nominal return when they
could instead hold money, which bears a guaranteed zero nominal re-
turn. Does the zero bound have normative implications for monetary policy?
The nominal interest rate tends to be low when expected inﬂation is low, so the
lower expected inﬂation is, the more likely it is that zero nominal interest rates
would be encountered. Some have argued that the zero bound’s proximity at
low inﬂation constitutes an argument against policy that results in low inﬂation
or deﬂation.1 Here we compare moderately deﬂationary and moderately inﬂa-
tionary regimes using a macroeconomic model to evaluate whether the zero
bound introduces distortions that make low inﬂation undesirable.
The model and the method distinguish our analysis from other recent re-
search on the same topic.2 The model has optimizing behavior by individuals
and ﬁrms, with the qualiﬁcation that ﬁrms’ price setting is staggered. Other
analyses of the zero bound have also used sticky-price models; the zero bound
is more likely to be important if nominal disturbances have real effects, as
they do with sticky prices. Individuals in the model choose to hold money
because it decreases the time they must spend shopping. Other analyses have
not modeled money demand. The method we employ involves solving the entire
model nonlinearly, which means directly imposing the zero bound on nominal
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interest rates. We then compare the two inﬂation regimes in several ways, one
of which involves using an explicit welfare metric, the representative agent’s
expected utility.
In the model, a deﬂationary regime where nominal interest rates are occa-
sionally zero generates higher welfare than a moderate inﬂation regime where
nominal interest rates are always positive. This striking result—which conﬂicts
with the spirit if not the letter of previous work—can be attributed to two fac-
tors mentioned above. First, the fact that money demand is explicitly modeled
means that there is a distortion associated with positive nominal interest rates:
individuals waste resources economizing on real money balances. Second, while
the two-period staggered price-setting requirement makes prices sticky, it does
not make inﬂation sticky. When inﬂation is sticky, as in the models used by
Fuhrer and Madigan (1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (1998), for example,
the zero bound on nominal interest rates effectively means that real interest
rates are constrained in low-inﬂation regimes. In contrast, in the sticky-price
model used here, real interest rates are not constrained at low inﬂation. The
monetary authority can create temporary expected inﬂation when nominal rates
are zero, thereby pushing real rates down, as described by Mishkin (1996).
1. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Nominal interest rates are interest rates on marketable securities or loans de-
nominated in an economy’s unit of account. In contrast, real interest rates
apply to assets denominated in a market basket of goods and services. Irving
Fisher, who used the terms “money interest” and “real interest,” is traditionally
credited with being the ﬁrst to distinguish between nominal and real interest
rates. Fisher himself acknowledged, however, that he had many predecessors
who understood the distinction between nominal and real interest rates to some
degree.3
In Fisher’s original analysis, the relationship between the nominal (money)
interest rate and the real interest rate is but a special case of the relationships be-
tween interest rates denominated in any two standards of value. The celebrated
Fisher equation ﬁrst appears in “Appreciation and Interest,” in an example
where the two standards are gold and wheat. But, when Fisher introduces that
analysis, he poses the general question, “If a debt is contracted in either of two
standards and one of them is expected to change with reference to the other,
will the rate of interest be the same in both? Most certainly not” (Fisher 1896,
p. 6). The Fisher equation follows three pages later: 1 + j = (1 + a)(1 + i),
3 Fisher’s important works on this subject are “Appreciation and Interest,” The Rate of Inter-
est, and The Theory of Interest. See Humphrey ([1983] 1986), and Laidler (1991) for a discussion
of Fisher’s predecessors.      
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where j and i are the rates of interest in wheat and gold, respectively, and a
is the (certain) expected rate of appreciation of gold in terms of wheat. This
generality on Fisher’s part is important, because it provides him with a principle
for understanding why the money interest rate is bounded by zero. Fisher states
that the interest rate cannot be negative in any standard that can be hoarded
without loss. The argument is straightforward: individuals would choose to
hoard the standard itself rather than hold securities or loans denominated in
that standard and yielding negative interest. For perishable standards, however,
the situation is different: “One can imagine a loan based on strawberries or
peaches contracted in summer and payable in winter with negative interest”
(Fisher 1896, p. 32). Since ﬁat money is storable at near zero cost, it follows
that the nominal interest rate in a modern, ﬁat-money economy is approximately
bounded by zero.
The zero bound is clearly a constraint on monetary policy, but is it an
important constraint? In order to answer this question, one needs a macro-
economic model and a criterion for measuring importance. To understand the
contribution made by this article, one should ﬁrst know something about the
models and criteria used in recent analyses by Fuhrer and Madigan (1997),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), and Orphanides and Wieland (1998).4
Fuhrer and Madigan (1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (1998) use sim-
ilar models, so we will consider them together. As with our analysis below,
they assess the zero bound’s importance by comparing their models’ perfor-
mance at a moderate inﬂation target to that at an inﬂation target low enough
to make the nominal interest rate occasionally zero. Fuhrer and Madigan use a
small model that contains (i) a backward-looking IS curve, (ii) an overlapping
price-contracting speciﬁcation, and (iii) a monetary policy reaction function.5
Orphanides and Wieland’s model shares the same contracting speciﬁcation but
disaggregates the IS curve into separate spending equations for consumption,
ﬁxed investment, inventory investment, net exports, and government spend-
ing. Neither model includes money. Monetary policy operates by changing the
short-term nominal interest rate. Long-term real interest rates enter the spend-
ing equations, but because the contracting speciﬁcation makes inﬂation sticky,
persistent changes in the short-term nominal rate generate changes in the long-
term real rate. Thus, monetary policy can affect real spending and hence output.
In both models, the equations representing private sector behavior are posited
rather than derived from explicit optimization problems.
Fuhrer and Madigan evaluate the zero bound’s importance by comparing
their model’s responses to IS curve shocks at inﬂation targets of zero and 4
4 The “liquidity trap” literature associated with Keynes ([1936] 1964) and Patinkin (1965)
concerned the possibility of a positive lower bound on nominal interest rates. Relating that liter-
ature to recent work would be an article by itself.
5 It is the same model used in Fuhrer and Moore (1995).  
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percent. In contrast, Orphanides and Wieland simulate their model using esti-
mated shock processes and compare the variance of output at different inﬂation
targets. The general conclusion of these papers is that at a zero inﬂation target,
monetary policy is signiﬁcantly constrained by the zero bound, in the sense
that the zero bound is encountered regularly, and output is consequently more
variable than at a moderate inﬂation target. The easiest explanation for this
result comes from the ﬁrst example in Fuhrer and Madigan, a permanent shock
to the IS curve. The monetary authority responds to this shock by lowering
short-term nominal interest rates. When the inﬂation target is zero, the mone-
tary authority cannot lower the nominal rate by as much as it would choose if
the inﬂation target were 4 percent. With sticky inﬂation, the decline in the real
interest rate is also smaller, and therefore—because of the interest rate effect
on spending—there is a larger fall in output at the zero inﬂation target. This
fall in output is presumed to be bad, although that presumption is not implied
by the model.
The principal virtue of the analysis conducted by Fuhrer and Madigan
(1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (1998) is that it is performed using mod-
els that ﬁt a particular sample of data quite well. However, their low inﬂation
experiments are conducted in an economic environment quite different from
the data sample. Therefore, the fact that the models’ equations are not derived
from explicit objective functions makes it doubtful that those equations would
be stable in the face of the contemplated policy experiments. Although the
model we use has not been shown to ﬁt recent data well, it is valuable because
it is set up with explicit objective functions for individuals and ﬁrms. This
means that the model can legitimately be used for policy and welfare analysis.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) come to a slightly different conclusion
about the importance of the zero bound as a constraint on monetary policy,
using a different model and approach from those of Fuhrer and Madigan and
Orphanides and Wieland. As we will also, Rotemberg and Woodford use a
sticky-price model whose equations are derived from explicit optimization prob-
lems, and they use the utility function of agents in the model to measure the
welfare associated with different monetary policy rules. However, Rotemberg
and Woodford linearize their model to simplify the analysis, and this precludes
them from directly imposing the zero bound. They account for the zero bound
indirectly by assuming that the variability of the monetary authority’s interest
rate instrument is constrained by the average level of interest rates, that is,
by the inﬂation target. Speciﬁcally, they assume that the ratio of the standard
deviation of the nominal interest rate to the average level of the nominal inter-
est rate can be no greater than the ratio that describes their 1980–1995 U.S.
sample. Thus, policy rules that generate high variability of nominal rates are
incompatible with low inﬂation targets. Since a generic implication of models
such as theirs is that stable inﬂation requires volatile nominal interest rates,
their assumption implies a sharp tradeoff between the level of inﬂation and       
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its variability. While this assumption has the effect of increasing the optimal
inﬂation target from zero in their model, the optimum does not move far from
zero.
All three papers discussed above exclude money from the models. Rotem-
berg and Woodford correctly state that the behavior of their model would
be unchanged if they used a money-in-the-utility function speciﬁcation where
money was additively separable in the period utility function. However, ignor-
ing money demand also means ignoring the welfare costs of positive nominal
interest rates. That is, while the behavior of real and nominal variables may be
invariant to incorporating money in an additively separable way, the welfare
implications of different monetary policies are not invariant to this modiﬁca-
tion. Since concern about the zero bound on nominal interest rates boils down
to concern about the welfare level associated with very low inﬂation targets,
leaving money out of the model may be an important omission.
2. A MODEL WITH STAGGERED PRICE SETTING
Our analysis of the zero bound’s importance for monetary policy is based on
an explicit optimizing sticky-price model similar to, but simpler than, the one
in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). As in Fuhrer and Madigan (1997) and
Orphanides and Wieland (1998), we impose the zero bound directly, rather
than measuring its importance indirectly.6 However, we take our analysis two
steps further. First, we explicitly model money demand (using a shopping-time
technology), so there is a force working in favor of zero nominal interest rates.
Second, no linear approximations are employed to solve the model, which is
fundamentally nonlinear.
The model follows the tradition of Taylor (1980), in that price setting is
staggered: each ﬁrm sets its price for two periods, with one half of the ﬁrms
adjusting each period.7 As in Taylor’s model, monetary policy is nonneutral
in the model because stickiness in individual prices gives rise to stickiness in
the price level. There are a continuum of ﬁrms, and they produce differentiated
consumption goods using labor provided by consumers at a competitive wage
as the sole input. Consumers are inﬁnitely lived and use income from their
labor, which is supplied elastically, to purchase consumption goods. Consumers
hold money in order to economize on transactions time, as in McCallum and
Goodfriend ([1987] 1988).
6 Fuhrer and Madigan use three different approaches, one of which involves directly imposing
the zero bound.
7 The remainder of this section is loosely based on Section 2 in King and Wolman (forth-
coming 1999). The model analyzed here differs in that it explicitly motivates money demand with
a shopping-time technology.               
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Consumers





¯t ¢ [ln(ct) + Ât ¢ lt]. (1)
The discount factor ¯ is set to 0.985, and the variable Ât is a random preference

















and the time constraint is
nt + lt + h[Mt/(Ptct)] = E, (2)
where Pt is the price level, Mt is nominal money balances chosen in period t
to carry over to t+1, Bt is holdings of one-period nominal zero-coupon bonds
maturing at t+1, Rt is the interest rate on nominal bonds, wt is the real wage,
nt is time spent working, dt is real dividend payments from ﬁrms, St is a lump-
sum transfer of money from the monetary authority, h[Mt/(Ptct)] is time spent
transacting, and E is the time endowment. Deﬁning real balances to be mt ´
Mt/Pt, the function h(¢) is parameterized as in Wolman (1997):





º +­ , for mt/ct < A ¢ Áº,
h(mt/ct) =­ , for mt/ct ¸ A ¢ Áº, (3)
with Á = 1.4 £ 10¡3, A = 1.7 £ 10¡2, and º = ¡0.7695. Transactions time is
thus decreasing in real balances and increasing in consumption, up to a satiation
level of the ratio of real balances to consumption.
Goods Market Structure
As in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), we assume that every producer faces a
downward-sloping demand curve with constant elasticity ". 9 The consumption







as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
8 This value of ¯ implies a steady-state real interest rate of 6.5 percent per annum and hence
a steady-state nominal interest rate of about 11.5 percent when there is 5 percent annual inﬂation.
While the number assigned to ¯ has quantitative implications for the results reported below, it
does not have qualitative implications.
9 We assume " = 10.           
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Since all producers that adjust their prices in a given period choose the
same price, it is easier to write the consumption aggregate as

















where cj,t is the quantity consumed in period t of a good whose price was set









t¡j is the nominal price at time t of any good whose price was set j





















If we attach Lagrange multipliers ¸t and ¹t to the budget and time constraints,
respectively, so that ¸t is the marginal value of real wealth and ¹t is the mar-
ginal value of time, the ﬁrst-order conditions for the individual’s maximization
problem, with respect to ct, lt, nt, Bt, and Mt, are
1
ct





Ât = ¹t, (8)
¹t = wt ¢ ¸t, (9)
¸t
Pt
















.( 1 1 )
In choosing consumption optimally (as in [7]), the individual weighs the ben-
eﬁt of consuming a marginal unit, which is the left-hand side of (7), against
the cost, which consists of both forfeited real wealth (the ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side) and time spent transacting (the second term on the right-hand
side). In choosing leisure and labor supply optimally (as in [8] and [9]), the
individual weighs the marginal value of time against both the marginal utility
of leisure and the wage earnings that the time would yield. The choice of bond
holdings (equation [10]) equates the marginal value of nominal wealth today
to (1 + Rt) times the marginal value of nominal wealth tomorrow. And ﬁnally,                   
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optimal money holdings (equation [11]) imply that the individual equates the
transactions-facilitating beneﬁt to the foregone interest cost of holding money.10
Firms
Each ﬁrm produces with an identical technology:
cj,t = nj,t, j = 0,1, (12)
where nj,t is the labor input employed in period t by a ﬁrm whose price was
set in period t¡j. Given the price a ﬁrm charges, it hires enough labor to meet
the demand for its product at that price. Firms that do not adjust their price
in a given period can thus be thought of as passive, whereas ﬁrms that adjust
their price do so optimally, that is, in order to maximize the present discounted
value of their proﬁts. Given that it has set a relative price
P¤
t¡j
Pt , real proﬁts




¢ cjt ¡ wt ¢ njt, (13)
that is, revenue minus cost.
Optimal Price Setting
Maximization of present value implies that a ﬁrm chooses its current relative
price, taking into account the effect on current and expected future proﬁts. Sub-
stituting into (13) the demand curve (5) and the technology (12), the present






























for the two periods over which a price will be in effect. Differentiating (14)
with respect to P¤
t and setting the resulting expression equal to zero, one sees









j=0 ¯ jEt[¸t+j ¢ wt+j ¢ (Pt+j/Pt)" ¢ ct+j]
PJ¡1
j=0 ¯ jEt[¸t+j ¢ (Pt+j/Pt)"¡1 ¢ ct+j]
. (15)
10 The transactions-facilitating beneﬁt is given by
¹t
Pt ¢ h0(¢)( 1




Pt+1 (see [10]). A conventional money demand equation can be derived by
combining (9)–(11): mt/ct = A ¢f [Rt/(1 + Rt)] ¢ (ct/wt) + Ágº .           
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Essentially, the optimal relative price equates discounted marginal revenue with
discounted marginal cost; the numerator of (15) represents marginal cost and
the denominator marginal revenue.11 In a noninﬂationary steady state, the ﬁrm
would choose a markup over marginal cost of
"
"¡1. In an inﬂationary or de-
ﬂationary steady state, the markup would differ from
"
"¡1, as adjusting ﬁrms
would take into account the future erosion (or inﬂation) of their relative price
(see King and Wolman [forthcoming 1999] for details). With uncertainty, the
markup becomes time varying: it depends on the current and expected future
marginal utility of wealth, price level, aggregate demand, and real wage.
Driving Process
The only exogenous variable in the model is the preference shock Ât, and it is
assumed to follow a two-state Markov process:
Pr
¡





Ât = Â j Ât¡1 = Â
´
= 0.8, Â < Â. (16)
Thus, Ât varies between high and low values, and on average each value per-
sists for ﬁve periods before switching. This process is not meant to replicate
actual features of the U.S. economy. Rather, it is chosen to make the economy
alternate between periods of high and low output in a way that makes the real
interest rate vary over time. It is by no means the only process that would
yield such behavior. The equilibrium behavior of the real interest rate will be
affected by monetary policy as well as by the shock process.
Monetary Policy
As described below, we assume that policy is characterized by a feedback rule
for the nominal interest rate. One component of the feedback rule is a “target”
inﬂation rate, an inﬂation rate that the rule would deliver in the absence of
shocks. In general, the feedback rule makes the nominal rate a differentiable
function of observable variables. In certain states of the world, however, that
differentiable function would make the nominal rate negative. In those states
of the world, we assume that the policy rule sets Rt = 0. Given the nominal
interest rate implied by the policy rule, the monetary transfer (St) is determined
by money demand. Note that money demand is an integral part of the model. It
is sometimes asserted that when the monetary authority follows an interest rate
rule, money demand can be left out of the model, as it only serves to determine
the value of the money supply. Here that is not the case, because the quantity
11 Note that in this sentence, marginal revenue and cost are with respect to price, not quantity.       
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of money enters other equations of the model in addition to the money demand
equation (speciﬁcally [7] and [2]).
The nominal interest rate is the rate on one-period bonds, which are as-
sumed to be in zero net supply. This is somewhat problematic from the stand-
point of justifying the zero bound. That is, the zero bound is a necessary
characteristic of nominal bonds that are willingly held, but nominal bonds are
not actually held in the model (they are priced). This inconsistency can be
rectiﬁed by assuming that there is a ﬁxed real quantity of outstanding govern-
ment bonds, and the government pays the interest on those bonds by levying
lump-sum taxes as necessary.
Solving the Model
The standard method used for solving dynamic stochastic models such as this
one is to calculate the steady state for a given inﬂation rate, and then linearize
the model’s equations around that steady state. Linearization would be inap-
propriate here, because it would rule out imposing the zero bound on nominal
interest rates. Instead of linearizing, then, we solve the model using a crude
version of the ﬁnite element method (see McGrattan [1996]). This method
involves picking a grid of points for the model’s state variable, P¤
t¡1, and then
ﬁnding values of the “control” variables numerically for each grid point and for
each value of the preference shock such that the model’s equations are approx-
imately satisﬁed. The solution consists of mappings from the state variable to
each of the other variables. Those mappings can be used in conjunction with the
stochastic process for the preference shock to simulate the model. Because this
solution method involves a ﬁnite number of grid points, it necessarily yields
only an approximate solution. However, to the extent that the true mappings
from the state variables to the other variables are smooth functions, the grid
method can yield an extremely accurate solution. Furthermore, the extent that
the mappings appear nonlinear gives an indication of the error that would be
associated with linearization methods.
3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ZERO BOUND IN THE MODEL
Using the model described above, one can determine whether the zero bound
means that a very low inﬂation target (here it will be deﬂation) signiﬁcantly
modiﬁes economic performance relative to a moderate inﬂation target. For a
particular speciﬁcation of monetary policy, we will simulate the model at mod-
erate inﬂation and then at moderate deﬂation, and compare the results along
three dimensions. The ﬁrst involves simulating the model for 30 periods with
the same shocks at high and low inﬂation, and informally comparing the results.
The second involves the variances of inﬂation and output, which has been the
conventional metric in the literature on monetary policy rules (see the papers in            
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Taylor [forthcoming 1999]). Given that the model yields an obvious choice for
a welfare function (the representative agent’s expected utility), we also compare
the two regimes in terms of welfare.
Model Simulations
Recent research on monetary policy has emphasized “Taylor rules,” that is,
speciﬁcations of policy where the monetary authority sets a short-term interest
rate as a linear combination of deviations of inﬂation from a target and devia-
tions of output from some trend or potential level. These rules, popularized by
John Taylor (1993), have been shown to be parsimonious approximations of
the behavior of actual central banks and to have reasonable properties in certain
theoretical models. The rule used below is similar to a Taylor rule, except that
instead of inﬂation on the right-hand side it uses the price level. Concretely,12
Rt = max
½




where R¤ is the steady-state nominal interest rate consistent with the chosen
inﬂation target, ¯ Pt is a target price-level path that grows at the targeted inﬂation
rate, and ¯ c is the steady-state level of consumption associated with the inﬂation
target.13 This rule implies that the price level will always be expected to return
to the same trend path. In contrast, the standard Taylor rules imply that inﬂation
will always be expected to eventually return to target, but the price level will
be expected to drift away from any previous trend path.14
Introduction to the Functions Describing General Equilibrium
As background to the simulation results, Figure 1 displays the relationships
between key endogenous variables and the state variable, which is the price set
last period by adjusting ﬁrms. Figure 1 is generated with an inﬂation target of 5
percent. The solid lines show the relationship between P¤
t¡1 (detrended by the
targeted inﬂation rate) and each endogenous variable when the preference shock
takes on a high value, and the dashed lines show the relationships when the
preference shock takes on a low value. Using panel b, and with knowledge of
P¤
0, one can trace out a path for P¤
t by drawing values of Ât from the stochastic
12 The interest rate in (17) is a quarterly interest rate, whereas the rates plotted in Figures
1–4 are annual rates.
13 The inﬂation target affects steady-state consumption for two reasons. First, the markup
chosen by adjusting ﬁrms varies with the inﬂation target in a way that does not exactly offset
the inﬂation erosion of nonadjusting ﬁrms’ markups. Second, by lowering real balances, higher
inﬂation effectively makes consumption more expensive.
14 The original motivation for using a price-level target here instead of an inﬂation target
was computational ease. It turns out, however, that analyzing an inﬂation-targeting policy is no
more demanding than analyzing price-level targeting. We are studying inﬂation-targeting policies
in ongoing research.    
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Figure 1 Functions Mapping State Variable (P¤
t¡1) to Other Variables at




























1.25 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.50
c
b.  LN(detrended P* t)
d.  LN(detrended Mt)
a.  Ct
c.   Nominal Ratet
1.25 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.50
1.25 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.50








LN(P*   ) t -1
LN(P*   ) t -1
LN(P*   ) t -1
LN(P*   ) t -1         
A. L. Wolman: Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates 13
process governing it. Then, with the path for P¤
t in hand, the relationships in
panels a, c, and d can be used to generate paths for the other variables for the
given sequence of Ât. What follows is a discussion of the model’s principal
mechanisms in light of the relationships shown in Figure 1.
There are essentially two determinants of current-period variables in the
model. One is the value of the stochastic preference parameter (Ât), and the
other is the value of the price that adjusting ﬁrms set last period. When Ât
takes on a high value, the marginal utility of leisure is high. Agents react by
supplying less labor to the market, and this reaction brings with it a decrease in
consumption. Thus, in panel a, the level of consumption is low when Ât = Â.
For low values of P¤
t¡1, the lower level of consumption causes the monetary
authority to set a lower value for the nominal interest rate, as in the left-hand
part of panel c, and the lower nominal interest rate in turn drives up money
demand (panel d). However, when P¤
t¡1 is especially high, the nominal rate is
lower in the Â (high-consumption) state. Why is this the case? The feedback
rule for monetary policy sets the nominal rate as an increasing function of both
consumption and the price level, so it must be that in the high-P¤
t¡1 region the
price-level effect dominates in the feedback rule. The policy functions for the
price level (not shown) indeed reﬂect this fact. The price level is higher in the
Â state than in the Â state, and the gap between the price levels in the two
states is increasing in P¤
t¡1.
Another perspective on the nominal interest rate functions in panel c comes
from thinking about two relationships emphasized by Irving Fisher. We have
already seen the “Fisher Equation: I,” which states that the nominal interest
rate is approximately equal to the sum of the real interest rate and expected
inﬂation.15 But Fisher also provided the seminal discussion of the relationship
between real interest rates and current and future marginal utilities of con-
sumption. Since the real interest rate is the price at which agents can trade
current consumption for future consumption, it follows that agents will choose
an expected consumption path to equate the real interest rate to the ratio of
marginal utilities of current and future consumption. When utility is logarithmic
in consumption, as it is here, this “Fisher Equation: II” implies that the real
interest rate is approximately equal to expected consumption growth.16
From panel a, we know that consumption and the preference parameter
move in opposite directions. Further, the stochastic process for the preference
parameter is mean reverting, so that when Ât is low it is expected to increase,
and, therefore, consumption is expected to fall. From Fisher’s second equation,
15 For an explanation of why the “Fisher Equation: I” is only approximately correct, see
Sarte (1998).
16 The relationship is only approximate here because the shopping time requirement means
that the marginal utility of consumption is greater than the marginal value of a unit of real wealth.
To derive this approximate relationship, combine (7) and (10) above.       
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real interest rates are then low when the preference parameter is low. Note,
however, that the policy rule typically makes nominal rates high in those cases
when we have just argued that real rates are low. From Fisher’s ﬁrst equation,
it must then be that high nominal rates correspond to high enough expected
inﬂation to counteract the low real rates. From panel d we can see that mon-
etary policy does in fact deliver high expected inﬂation when the preference
parameter is low. The money supply is low when the preference parameter is
low, and mean reversion implies that the money supply is expected to increase
in those periods, generating high expected inﬂation.
Note that the behavior of real interest rates conﬂicts with the behavior
displayed in the other articles discussed above. There the monetary authority
lowers nominal interest rates when output is low, and real rates fall as well.
Here, for the most part, the monetary authority also decreases nominal interest
rates when output is low. However, real interest rates are to a great extent
determined by the shock process in conjunction with Fisher’s second equation.
For a large class of such processes that includes the one used here, real interest
rates are low when output is high. More generally, it has proven difﬁcult to
produce models where the cyclical behavior of real rates matches the data
without resorting to the type of reduced form modeling employed by Fuhrer
and Madigan (1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (1998).
Simulated Time Paths
Figure 2 displays the time paths of the variables from Figure 1 other than P¤
t ,
as well as the price level, the real interest rate, and expected inﬂation, for a
sequence of 30 Ât drawn from the stochastic process described above. This
sequence will be a benchmark for comparison with the low inﬂation target
case below. Focusing ﬁrst on consumption (panel a), note that there are essen-
tially three regions: low, high, and intermediate. The high-consumption region
is attained with any sequence of at least two consecutive low values for Ât
(the realizations of Ât are plotted in panel b). Likewise, the low-consumption
region is attained with any sequence of at least two consecutive high values for
Ât. These regions correspond to the points marked x in Figure 1a and b. The
intermediate-consumption region corresponds to the transition from one value
of the preference shock to the other; these are the points marked y in Figure
1a and b. The fact that it takes two periods to transit between the high- and
low-consumption regions is an implication of two-period price stickiness. To
see this, suppose the economy had been in the low preference parameter/high-
consumption state for several periods. If Ât then took on a high value, in the
initial period the state variable (P¤
t¡1) would be at the level associated with Â,
so that the economy could not immediately transit to low consumption. If Ât
remained high in the next period, consumption would settle at a lower level,
because the state variable had changed; by the period after the shift in Ât, all       
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Figure 2 Time Paths from 30-Period Simulation
(5 Percent Inﬂation Target)
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ﬁrms would have had a chance to adjust their price. If prices were ﬂexible,
the transition would be immediate, whereas with prices set for more than two
periods the transition would be correspondingly longer.
Note that in some of the periods when consumption takes on an interme-
diate value, the real rate is negative (Figure 2f). Speciﬁcally, this occurs in
periods when Ât = Â and Ât¡1 = Â (periods 12, 17, and 20). Referring back       
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to Figure 1, one can see that in this situation consumption is expected to fall
towards the low level associated with Â. With consumption expected to fall
signiﬁcantly, the real rate must be negative. Because the inﬂation target is 5
percent, the zero bound does not inhibit the real rate from going negative. How-
ever, one might expect that with a very low inﬂation target, the real rate would
be inhibited from going negative, and thus the zero bound would interfere with
the economy’s “natural” behavior.
Figures 3 and 4 correspond to Figures 1 and 2, with an inﬂation target of ¡5
percent. From Figure 3a–c, we see that for a wide range of values of the state
variable, including the region corresponding to high consumption, the nominal
rate is zero. This drastically different behavior of the nominal rate, however,
does not correspond to signiﬁcantly different functions for consumption (Figure
3a). The simulation in Figure 4 conﬁrms these results. Whereas we surmised
that the nominal rate might hit the zero bound when Ât = Â and Ât¡1 = Â,
in fact it hits the bound whenever Ât = Â. However, consumption behavior
is almost indistinguishable from Figure 2, the 5 percent inﬂation target. From
Fisher’s second equation, we know that similar consumption behavior must
correspond to similar real rate behavior, as conﬁrmed in Figure 4f. How is a
zero nominal rate consistent with a negative real rate in periods 12, 17, and
20? From Fisher’s ﬁrst equation, the real rate is the difference between the
nominal rate and expected inﬂation, so in those periods the monetary authority
is making expected inﬂation positive (panel c). The targeted rate of deﬂation
is consistent with periods of high expected inﬂation, because the policy rule
unambiguously makes the expected inﬂation temporary, and there is no uncer-
tainty about whether the monetary authority will adhere to the policy rule.
Simulations such as those in Figures 2 and 4 are an informal means of
evaluating whether the zero bound is important. However, those simulations
provide clear evidence—at least in the model used here—that monetary policy
can offset the zero bound by generating temporary expected inﬂation. With
real rates thus unconstrained, the existence of the zero bound does not appear
to constitute an argument against a low inﬂation target. Figure 4 illustrates an
additional feature of the model that favors a very low inﬂation target. In panels
a and f, the series for consumption and real rates from Figure 2, correspond-
ing to a 5 percent inﬂation target, are reproduced along with the new series
corresponding to 5 percent deﬂation. In panel a, we see that consumption is
actually higher in every period with the 5 percent deﬂation target than it is with
the 5 percent inﬂation target. The lower inﬂation target corresponds to lower
nominal interest rates on average, as is shown clearly in panel d of Figures
2 and 4. Lower nominal interest rates in turn correspond to a smaller money
demand distortion, as in Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969). Individuals hold
higher real balances because the opportunity cost of real balances has fallen,
and higher real balances effectively make consumption cheaper, because they
decrease the time that an individual must spend transacting.    
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Figure 3 Functions Mapping State Variable (P¤
t¡1) to Other Variables at
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Figure 4 Time Paths from 30-Period Simulation
(5 Percent Deﬂation Target)
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Note: Dashed series are from Figure 2 (5 percent inﬂation target).
Variances
The simulations in Figures 2 and 4 provide strong evidence on the importance
of the zero bound, and the welfare results below give the bottom line. To en-
hance comparability with the articles by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and
Orphanides and Wieland (1998), we also provide information on variability at      
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high and low inﬂation targets. Table 1 shows the standard deviations of some of
the main variables in the model for both regimes, based on simulations of 5,000
periods. As suggested by Figures 1–4, the variability of consumption is barely
affected by the inﬂation target. On the other hand, the nominal interest rate is
much less variable when the inﬂation target makes zero occasionally binding.
There is a tradeoff in the model between the average level of inﬂation and the
minimum feasible variability of inﬂation, just as described in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997). Also as in that paper, the large difference in nominal interest
rate variability in the two regimes translates into only a small difference in
inﬂation variability. A striking feature of Table 1 is the tremendous increase
in money supply variability in the deﬂation regime. This can be traced to the
fact that the money demand function exhibits increasing sensitivity to nominal
interest rates as the nominal interest rate falls.
Table 1 Standard Deviations in the Two Policy Regimes
Consumption Inﬂation Nominal rates Money
5 percent inﬂation 0.0427 0.0706 0.0145 0.0910
5 percent deﬂation 0.0435 0.0786 0.0093 0.7562
Welfare
The motivation for this article came from the idea that low inﬂation targets
might be bad because of distortions introduced by the zero bound on nominal
interest rates. It is clear from the simulations presented thus far that in fact
the real (as opposed to nominal) distortions associated with the zero bound are
small. Nevertheless, it is interesting to know whether the inﬂation or deﬂation
regime is preferred on welfare grounds. When the zero bound is not a factor,
a welfare comparison will hinge on the other distortions present in the model.
Those other distortions involve the inﬂation tax and the interaction between
sticky prices and monopolistic competition. The inﬂation tax distortion makes
deﬂation preferable to inﬂation. Sticky prices and monopolistic competition
make the optimal inﬂation target near zero, so neither 5 percent inﬂation nor
deﬂation targets would obviously be preferred to the other on that basis. It
therefore seems likely that the unambiguous effect of the inﬂation tax will
dictate that the lower inﬂation regime is preferred. However, to resolve the
issue deﬁnitively, we must compare the representative individual’s expected
utility in the inﬂation and deﬂation regimes.
We calculate expected utility by performing 1,000 simulations of 1,000
periods each, with each simulation beginning from a random value for the
state variable. The initial condition is chosen by simulating the model for 50          
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periods, starting from the steady state, and then setting P0 = P50. Each sim-
ulation (k = 1 to 1,000) yields a value for Uk ´
P1,000
t=0 ¯t ¢ [ln(ct) + Ât ¢ lt],
and then expected utility is given by E(U) = 1,000¡1 ¢
P1,000
k=1 Uk. With values
for expected utility in both regimes, we compare the regimes by pretending
that they were generated in a steady state. We calculate the average per-period
utility in the two regimes and then the percentage increase in consumption that
would make an agent living in the lower utility regime just as well-off as an
agent in the higher utility regime. The results of this exercise are that an agent
living in the inﬂationary regime would be indifferent between receiving a 2.6
percent increase in per-period consumption and switching to the deﬂationary
regime.
To illustrate the importance of the inﬂation tax in these results, we can
repeat the comparison of the two inﬂation regimes with a slight modiﬁcation.
That modiﬁcation is to eliminate the money demand distortion; we modify (7)
to ¸t = 1/ct and replace (11) with Mt = Pt¢ct. With the inﬂation tax eliminated,
the 5 percent inﬂation target regime is marginally preferred to the 5 percent
deﬂation target regime, although the difference in welfare is minuscule com-
pared to the difference found (with opposite sign) when the inﬂation tax played
a role. The results from eliminating the money demand distortion mean that
money demand is crucial in making the deﬂationary regime welfare-superior to
the inﬂationary regime. However, even without the money demand distortion,
the fact that the nominal interest rate is occasionally zero in the deﬂationary
regime does not signiﬁcantly affect the behavior of real variables. In particular,
the policy rule is still able to generate temporarily high expected inﬂation when
real rates need to be negative.
Open Questions
With respect to the speciﬁc model used here, at least three modiﬁcations would
be interesting to analyze. The ﬁrst modiﬁcation deals with the speciﬁcation
of price stickiness. Structural models of sticky inﬂation are ad hoc, but they
have been shown to ﬁt recent data well. It should be possible to modify the
price block of the current model to make inﬂation sticky. The resulting speci-
ﬁcation would not simply repeat the work of Orphanides and Wieland (1998)
and Fuhrer and Madigan (1997), because it would incorporate money demand.
Solving such a model would be more computationally intensive than solving
the model in this article, because it would include additional state variables
associated with the pricing speciﬁcation.
The second modiﬁcation is related to the ﬁrst; it involves changing the pol-
icy rule from the price-level form to the more common inﬂation form. Possibly
with such a rule and a low inﬂation target the monetary authority would be less
able to generate the temporary expected inﬂation necessary to drive real rates
negative. More generally, it would be interesting to study the properties of a     
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wide range of rules and to ﬁnd out what the optimal rule is. Experiments with
a rule that speciﬁes the money supply instead of the nominal interest rate as the
policy instrument yield similar results to those above, in that the deﬂationary
regime is preferred to the inﬂationary regime. The interest rate rule generates
higher welfare than the money rule, but that comparison is limited, focusing
on two speciﬁc rules as opposed to classes of rules. In terms of optimal rules,
King and Wolman (forthcoming 1999) ﬁnd that it is optimal to stabilize the
price level if the money demand distortion is nonexistent. With that distortion
present, optimal policy will undoubtedly involve some deﬂation, but it is not
clear exactly what the optimal policy rule is.17
The third modiﬁcation is one that takes more seriously the ﬁscal aspect
of monetary policy. Work by Woodford (1996) and Sims (1994) emphasizes
the joint behavior of ﬁscal and monetary policy. This joint behavior might be
especially relevant when interest rates are near zero, because at zero nominal
interest rates, ﬁscal and monetary policy effectively become uniﬁed; money
and government bonds are perfect substitutes.
Apart from the speciﬁcs of the model, the assumption that agents in the
model have perfect information about the policy rule is crucial. We found that
zero nominal interest rates did not prevent the real rate from falling, because
the monetary authority could generate expected inﬂation when the nominal rate
was zero. Agents know that any inﬂation that ensues will be temporary, and
that the monetary authority remains committed to its stated inﬂation target,
so these occasional periods of high expected inﬂation do not trigger inﬂation
scares. In practice, central banks might have concerns about being able to
generate occasional episodes of high expected inﬂation without endangering
the credibility of their low inﬂation target. In principle it would be possible to
analyze this sort of issue in an extension of the current framework.
A fundamental assumption underlying all recent work on the zero bound is
that negative ex ante real interest rates are occasionally a natural characteristic
of the U.S. economy. It is a trivial matter to look at data on ex post real rates
and see that at the short end of the yield curve they have been negative on
many occasions. It is less clear that ex ante real rates have been negative. From
Irving Fisher, we know that real rates deﬁned by the CPI can be negative only
to the extent that the market basket that makes up the CPI is not storable at
zero cost. Undoubtedly the inclusion of various services and perishable goods
means that in principle the ex ante real rate can be negative. Nonetheless, lack
of consensus about how to estimate inﬂation expectations means that widely
accepted series for ex ante real rates do not exist.
17 The approach taken in this article would suggest deﬁning the optimal policy rule as the rule
that generates the highest level of unconditional expected utility. King and Wolman (forthcoming
1999) use a different criterion; they ask what policy rule is implied by assuming that the monetary
authority maximizes agents’ expected utility given some arbitrary initial conditions.     
22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
4. CONCLUSIONS
Two general conclusions are supported by the theoretical analysis in this article.
First, the way money demand is modeled is important for how one evaluates
the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Existing work presumes that the
zero bound makes low inﬂation bad, because it prevents monetary policy from
optimally responding to shocks. But monetary theory supports a strong beneﬁt
to zero nominal interest rates, namely, eliminating inefﬁciencies associated with
holding “too little” money. The existence of those inefﬁciencies contributed to
the result in this article that, taking into account the zero bound, a regime with
moderate deﬂation yields higher welfare than a regime with moderate inﬂation.
The second conclusion is that stickiness of inﬂation is crucial in generating
costs of low inﬂation associated with the zero bound. If prices are sticky but
inﬂation is not, then real rates can fall even if nominal interest rates are very
low: the monetary authority simply creates some expected inﬂation if it wants
to drive real rates down.
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